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Abstract
Conventional wisdom is that corruption is a major obstacle of economic development. Yet, there is an unresolved
debate in the economic literature whether corruption is detrimental (Sand the Wheels Hypothesis - SWH) or
beneficial  (Grease the Wheels  Hypothesis  -  GWH).  While  SWH is  the mainstream idea,  the proponents  of  GWH
argue that corruption may be beneficial if governance is badly malfunctioning. Méon & Sekkat (2005) opposes this
view by stating that corruption not only hampers growth and investments but even more so if governance is bad,
which is what SWH strictly says. This paper challenges the finding by imitating the study with broader data. The
results corroborate GWH and comport with Méon & Weill (2008), which finds that corruption enhances aggregate
efficiency. The conclusion is that, in the second-best world of many developing countries, corruption may in effect
mitigate the deeply rooted distortions caused by flaws in rule of law and government efficiency. Therefore, efforts
should be put rather on reinforcing the legislative and administrative systems than on the plain fight against
corruption.
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JEL classification: D73
21 Introduction
A common understanding is that corruption is bad for economic development, and that it must be fought
out by all means. Still, there are also dissidents, including benevolent academics, who see some virtues in
it, too. In the literature of the economic effects of corruption, there is a fundamental and still unresolved
debate about whether the Sand the Wheel Hypothesis (SWH) or the Grease the Wheels Hypothesis (GWH)
is valid. Proponents of SWH say that corruption is harmful (e.g. Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001), while those of
GWH claim the opposite (e.g. Leff, 1964; Mendez & Sepulveda, 2006).
The key argument of the proponents of GWH is that further distortions caused by corruption in effect
mitigate more profound distortions that are deeply rooted in the malfunctioning governance of the corrupted
countries. In its strict form, GWH says that corruption is not only beneficial but particularly so if the quality
of governance is bad. The mirror image of this is strict SWH, saying that the effects of corruption are the
ghastlier the worse is the quality of governance.
For an interested reader, Méon & Sekkat (2005) provides a comprehensive survey on the literature on the
SWH-GWH debate. The paper also presents an empirical analysis on the effects of corruption on economic
growth and investments, and finds strong support for strict SWH, namely that corruption is found especially
harmful if the quality of governance is poor. Thus, the idea of corruption as a lubricant in bypassing pre-
existing distortions is definitely revoked. On the other hand, Méon & Weill (2008) finds clear support for
GWH when considering the effects of corruption on aggregate efficiency instead of growth and
investments. The disparity of these results is puzzling because one could expect that aggregate efficiency
would be positively related to growth and investments.
The interplay between efficiency, investments and growth would certainly be worthy of closer study, but
this paper takes a smaller step by tackling the puzzle by re-checking the results of Méon & Sekkat (2005).
This is done simply by using more extensive data, like the original paper actually suggests.1 This paper
proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the modelling and data, and section 3 reports the results of regular
regression analysis and discusses the findings. Section 4 presents recursive tests to illustrate and better
understand the results, and section 5 concludes. The analysis yields sound support for GWH thus differing
drastically from the conclusions of Méon & Sekkat (2005), and complying with those of Méon & Weill
(2008).
2 Data and modelling
Following Méon & Sekkat (2005), three data sets are used, namely macroeconomic data, corruption indices
and governance indicators. Macroeconomic data consist of panel data from 117 countries worldwide (listed
in Appendix 1) including information on real GDP per capita, and on typical determinants of economic
growth, namely physical capital, human capital, scope of internationalization, and population growth.
Physical capital is measured by average capital stock and denoted Investment.  Human capital, denoted
Education, is measured by the index of individual human capital based on schooling years (Barro & Lee,
2010) and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994). The scope of internationalization, denoted
Openness, is measured by the extent of international trade. The demographic factor of growth, namely
1 Appendix B of the original paper also lists some odd indicator values, but digging into whether they are typos or not is
omitted here.
3population growth, is denoted Population.  The data, available over 1970-2011, are provided by Penn World
Tables version 8.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015), except Openness which comes from the 7.1 version.
Corruption is monitored by two widely used indices. The first index set comes from the World Bank
(included in Worldwide Governance Indicators, and denoted WGI), available over 1996-2013. The second
set of indices comes from Transparency International (Corruption Perception Index, denoted CPI),
published since 1995.
The quality of governance is also monitored by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, and
they are originally constructed by Kaufmann et al. (1999). The following indicators are used: Voice and
accountability (denoted VA) which “reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and
a free media”; Political stability and lack of violence/terrorism (denoted LV) which “reflects perceptions
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”; Government effectiveness (denoted GE),
which “reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree
of its independence from political pressures, the quality if policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies”; Regulatory burden (denoted RB) which
“reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”; and Rule of law (denoted RL) which
“reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence”.
The data sets are considerably broader than those in Méon & Sekkat (2005). The macroeconomic data set
covers 117 countries over 1970-2011 compared to 70 countries over 1970-1998. Corruption indices and
governance indicators are used for 1998, 2000, and 2002–2011, while Méon & Sekkat (2005) focuses only
on 1998. Years 1999 and 2001 are omitted because WGI is not available for those years.
Two models are constructed, one for explaining economic growth, and the other for explaining investments
that are supposed to create growth. The first model reads
                   (1)
where t stands for periods, α:s are the coefficients to be estimated, and  is the error term. On the left-hand
side of equation (1), yt–y0 measures the variation of real GDP per capita (at chained Purchasing Power
Parities in 2005 US dollars), and y0 is real GDP per capita in 1970. The initial GDP appears also on the
right-hand side for a test of the conditional convergence hypothesis (Barro, 1991; Mankiw & Weil, 1992).
By the hypothesis, α1<0 would say that poorer countries catch up the richer ones by imitating their products,
technologies and business models.
In equation (1), z is a vector of the typical determinants of GDP growth for 1970-2011. Quite reasonably,
Investment and Education should foster growth, and so should also Openness by enhancing the transfer of
technologies, ideas, and best business practices (Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994; Scully, 2002). For all three,
the hypothesis is that α2>0. On the other hand, Population should hinder GDP growth in per capita terms
(α2<0, see Levine & Renelt, 1992).
e
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4In equation (1), cor is a vector of the two corruption variables. The original WGI scores vary from -2.5 to
2.5, and the original CPI scores vary from 0 to 10, with the lower bounds indicating utmost corruption and
the upper bounds indicating perfect integrity. For ease of interpretation, the original values are transformed
by subtracting the original WGI scores from 3.5, and the original CPI scores from 11. Thus, the transformed
WGI scores from 1 to 6, and the transformed CPI scores from 1 to 11. For both indices, 1 indicates perfect
integrity and the upper bound utmost corruption.
In equation (1), gov is a vector of the governance indicators. The original World Bank indicators score from
-2.5 to 2.5, with quality improving to the positive direction. Again, the indicators are transformed by
subtracting the original values from 3.5. This makes all the transformed indicators VA, LV, GE, RB, and RL
vary from 1 to 6, where the quality of governance falls as the score rises. The term gov*cor refers to the
interaction of corruption and the quality of governance. The interaction terms are constructed by
multiplication of the two corruption indices and the five governance indicators thus yielding 10 interaction
terms in total.
The second model explains the effects of corruption on investments. Physical capital appears now as a
dependent variable, expressed in terms of variation, and Population is  skipped  from  the  explanatory
variables. Equation (2) reads
(2)
where kt - k0 represents the variation of the capital stock, β:s denote the coefficients to be estimated, and µ
is the error term. On the right-hand side of equation (2), y0 appears again in the spirit of the conditional
convergence hypothesis arguing that β1<0, and ω denotes the vector of the remaining macroeconomic
variables, Education and Openness, with the assumption that β2>0. The interaction terms between the
quality of governance and corruption are again included.
3 Estimation results
In the estimations, the Generalized Least Squares technique is used to handle heteroscedasticity. Following
Méon & Sekkat (2005) and initiated by Mankiw & Weil (1992), all variables enter regressions in
logarithmic values. The data on corruption and governance cover the years 1998, 2000 and 2002–2011, but
the following discussion focuses on the most recent years 2009, 2010, and 2011. This is reasonable, because
they include more countries than the earlier years, and because the uncommented estimations do not yield
markedly different results. This holds especially for the year 1998 (see Appendix 2) so that all conclusions
can be compared to those of Méon & Sekkat (2005), including the robustness checks, which are reported
in Appendix 3.
The preliminary specifications of models (1) and (2) include the set of control variables of the dependent
variables, and the corruption variables thus yielding estimates for α0–α3 and β0–β3, respectively. The full
regression specifications include also the interaction terms between corruption and governance thus
yielding estimates for α4 and β4, too. The main interest is on the estimates for α3 and α4, and β3 and β4. The
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5benchmark result for validating SWH (and rejecting GWH) would be α3, β3 <0; α4, β4>0, and the benchmark
result for validating GWH (and rejecting SWH) would be α3, β3 >0; α4, β4 <0.
3.1 Effects on GDP per capita growth
The complete estimation results of the effects of corruption on GDP per capita growth for the years 2009,
2010 and 2011 are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Variation of real GDP per capita (with corruption and governance data of 2009- 2011)
Explanatory
variables
PS PS & VA PS & LV PS & GE PS & RB PS & RL
WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI
Intercept     09
                   10
                   11
0.51
(0.89)
0.39
(0.90)
0.107
(0.890
0.46
(0.95)
0.33
(0.97)
0.103
(0.935)
0.49
(0.89)
0.36
(0.90)
0.097
(0.892)
0.43
(0.95)
0.32
(0.97)
0.106
(0.935)
0.43
(0.85)
0.39
(0.87)
0.126
(0.868)
0.34
(0.91)
0.31
(0.94)
0.106
(0.913)
1.54.
(0.84)
1.32
(0.85)
0.964
(0.850)
1.29
(0.88)
1.10
(0.91)
0.911
(0.899)
1.13
(0.87)
0.95
(0.89)
0.594
(0.885)
0.97
(0.93)
0.84
(0.96)
0.592
(0.938)
0.98
(0.82)
0.85
(0.84)
0.640
(0.847)
0.74
(0.87)
0.66
(0.91)
0.588
(0.897)
y0 09
                   10
                   11
-0.43***
(0.07)
-0.41***
(0.07)
-0.40***
(0.072)
-0.41***
(0.07)
-0.39***
(0.07)
-0.38***
(0.072)
-0.43***
(0.07)
-0.41***
(0.07)
-0.40***
(0.072)
-0.41***
(0.07)
-0.40***
(0.07)
-0.38***
(0.072)
-0.44***
(0.07)
-0.43***
(0.07)
-0.41***
(0.070)
-0.44***
(0.07)
-0.42***
(0.07)
-0.41***
(0.071)
-0.47***
(0.06)
-0.44***
(0.07)
-0.43***
(0.067)
-0.47***
(0.06)
-0.45***
(0.07)
-0.44***
(0.069)
-0.46***
(0.07)
-0.44***
(0.07)
-0.42***
(0.071)
-0.45***
(0.07)
-0.43***
(0.07)
-0.42***
(0.072)
-0.46***
(0.06)
-0.45***
(0.07)
-0.43***
(0.068)
-0.47***
(0.06)
-0.45***
(0.07)
-0.44***
(0.070)
Investment 09
                   10
                   11
0.09**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.087**
(0.029)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.076*
(0.031)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.088**
(0.029)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.075*
(0.031)
0.11***
(0.03)
0.11***
(0.03)
0.109***
(0.029)
0.11***
(0.03)
0.11***
(0.03)
0.102**
(0.033)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.066*
(0.027)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.065*
(0.029)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.082**
(0.028)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.08*
(0.03)
0.076*
(0.031)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.03)
0.072**
(0.027)
0.07**
(0.03)
0.07*
(0.03)
0.069*
(0.030)
Education   09
                   10
                   11
1.78***
(0.30)
1.72***
(0.31)
1.76***
(0.326)
1.82***
(0.32)
1.77***
(0.33)
1.83***
(0.338)
1.67***
(0.32)
1.63***
(0.34)
1.737***
(0.350)
1.75***
(0.34)
1.73***
(0.35)
1.856***
(0.366)
1.53***
(0.30)
1.48***
(0.32)
1.508***
(0.334)
1.58***
(0.31)
1.52***
(0.33)
1.57***
(0.348)
1.28***
(0.29)
1.20***
(0.31)
1.244***
(0.325)
1.30***
(0.31)
1.23***
(0.32)
1.284***
(0.345)
1.46***
(0.30)
1.41***
(0.32)
1.438***
(0.340)
1.48***
(0.32)
1.46***
(0.34)
1.499***
(0.360)
1.44***
(0.28)
1.41***
(0.30)
1.461***
(0.316)
1.49***
(0.30)
1.46***
(0.32)
1.516***
(0.332)
Population 09
                   10
                   11
0.001
(0.002)
0.004
(0.01)
0.002
(0.019)
0.000
(0.002)
0.002
(0.01)
-0.006
(0.02)
0.001
(0.002)
0.005
(0.01)
0.003
(0.02)
0.001
(0.002)
0.003
(0.01)
-0.007
(0.022)
0.001
(0.002)
0.006
(0.01)
0.005
(0.019)
0.001
(0.002)
0.005
(0.01)
0.0005
(0.02)
0.000
(0.002)
0.004
(0.01)
0.005
(0.018)
0.001
(0.002)
0.005
(0.01)
0.007
(0.019)
0.000
(0.002)
0.004
(0.01)
0.002
(0.019)
0.000
(0.002)
0.003
(0.01)
0.0005
(0.02)
0.000
(0.002)
0.002
(0.01)
-0.002
(0.018)
0.000
(0.002)
0.003
(0.01)
-0.001
(0.019)
Openness    09
                   10
                   11
0.36***
(0.10)
0.37***
(0.10)
0.39***
(0.103)
0.35***
(0.10)
0.36***
(0.10)
0.377***
(0.105)
0.37***
(0.10)
0.38***
(0.10)
0.389***
(0.104)
0.36***
(0.10)
0.37***
(0.10)
0.374***
(0.106)
0.33***
(0.10)
0.34***
(0.10)
0.368***
(0.101)
0.32**
(0.10)
0.34***
(0.10)
0.36***
(0.103)
0.29**
(0.09)
0.31***
(0.09)
0.335***
(0.096)
0.27**
(0.09)
0.30***
(0.10)
0.323***
(0.099)
0.32***
(0.10)
0.34***
(0.10)
0.365***
(0.100)
0.32**
(0.10)
0.33***
(0.10)
0.354***
(0.103)
0.32***
(0.09)
0.33***
(0.09)
0.347***
(0.097)
0.31**
(0.09)
0.33***
(0.10)
0.338***
(0.100)
WGI            09
                   10
                   11
-0.32.
(0.18)
-0.32.
(0.18)
-0.241
(0.185)
-0.05
(0.36)
-0.08
(0.39)
-0.174
(0.407)
0.72*
(0.35)
0.61
(0.38)
0.597
(0.384)
1.48***
(0.40)
1.53***
(0.43)
1.566***
(0.451)
0.77*
(0.38)
0.69
(0.40)
0.773.
(0.427)
1.48***
(0.41)
1.46***
(0.45)
1.493**
(0.472)
CPI             09
                   10
                   11
-0.21
(0.15)
-0.20
(0.15)
-0.146
(0.150)
-0.01
(0.28)
-0.13
(0.29)
-0.191
(0.291)
0.52.
(0.27)
0.45
(0.28)
0.411
(0.281)
1.29***
(0.33)
1.19***
(0.34)
1.074**
(0.338)
0.58.
(0.30)
0.47
(0.31)
0.488
(0.312)
1.19***
(0.33)
1.06**
(0.34)
0.961**
(0.343)
Table 1continues on the next page.
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WGI*VA     09
                   10
                   11
-0.18
(0.22)
-0.16
(0.23)
-0.04
(0.241)
CPI*VA      09
                   10
                   11
-0.07
(0.15)
-0.04
(0.16)
0.029
(0.165)
WGI*LV     09
                   10
                   11
-0.67***
(0.203)
-0.60**
(0.22)
-0.55*
(0.222)
CPI*LV      09
                   10
                   11
-0.45**
(0.14)
-0.41**
(0.15)
-0.36*
(0.153)
WGI*GE    09
                   10
                   11
-1.23***
(0.25)
-1.24***
(0.26)
-1.21***
(0.279)
CPI*GE     09
                   10
                   11
-0.90***
(0.18)
-0.85***
(0.19)
-0.77***
(0.195)
WGI*RB     09
                   10
                   11
-0.78**
(0.24)
-0.71**
(0.25)
-0.71**
(0.27)
CPI*RB      09
                   10
                   11
-0.51**
(0.17)
-0.45*
(0.18)
-0.43*
(0.187)
WGI*RL     09
                   10
                   11
-1.15***
(0.24)
-1.12***
(0.26)
-1.09***
(0.276)
CPI*RL      09
                   10
                   11
-0.79***
(0.17)
-0.73***
(0.18)
-0.66***
(0.186)
N                09
                   10
                   11
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
Adj.-R2       09
                   10
                   11
0.466
0.459
0.454
0.453
0.445
0.444
0.469
0.461
0.454
0.454
0.445
0.444
0.512
0.492
0.481
0.499
0.479
0.469
0.557
0.546
0.529
0.549
0.530
0.511
0.510
0.493
0.484
0.493
0.475
0.468
0.552
0.533
0.518
0.542
0.515
0.499
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression variables with superscripts “***”, “**”, “*”, “.” indicating statistical significance
at 0, 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 % error level, respectively. GLS standard deviations are in parenthesis.
In Table 1, the estimates of the intercept term are overall positive (α0>0), but statistically insignificant. In
Méon & Sekkat (2005), the estimates are negative with notably bigger numbers, but insignificant, too. The
7coefficient of y0 is always negative (α1<0), and highly significant saying that the poorer economies catch-
up the richer ones, just like the conditional convergence hypothesis claims. Furthermore, the coefficient
estimates of the control variables Investment, Education, and Openness all get their expected signs (α2>0)
with high significance, but that of Population remains very close to zero, and insignificant. In any case, the
statistical significance of the estimates of the control variables is markedly higher than in Méon & Sekkat
(2005).
In the preliminary specification (column PS of Table 1), the explanatory variables seem to fit the model as
they  explain  almost  half  of  its  variance  (the  adjusted  R2 varying between 44.39 and 46.90 %). The
coefficients of both corruption variables WGI and CPI stay negative (α3<0) over the three years, which
suggests that corruption would hamper GDP growth over the whole sample. However, the estimate values
are notably small compared to those in Méon & Sekkat (2005), and all of them remain statistically
insignificant, whereas Méon & Sekkat (2005) reports considerably high significance for the coefficient of
the WGI index.
The remaining 5 columns of Table 1 report estimations with α4 0 in equation (1). The inclusion of the
interaction terms does not affect the signs and significance of the control variables, but a substantial
improvement is observed in the percentage of explained variance. Compared to PS, the adjusted-R2 has
increased in average about 4.65 (with WGI) and 4.44 (with CPI) percentage points over the period 2009–
2011.  The  estimates  of  the  corruption  coefficients  turn  mostly  positive  (α3>0) and their significance is
improved, especially with GE and RL.
In most cases, the coefficient tests associated with the interaction terms significantly reject the null
hypothesis α4 = 0 at the 5 % level thus telling about existing interplay between the quality of governance
and corruption. A closer look on the governance variables in Table 1 shows that, with VA, the estimates of
both α3 and α4 remain statistically insignificant. The estimates with respect to LV or RB are  a  bit  more
reliable, at least what comes to the effect of WGI and the respective interaction term. The GWH claim that
corruption tends to boost growth is thus modestly supported in countries that face flaws concerning LV or
RB. In these countries, α3>0 and α4<0 tell that the positive growth effect of corruption is even strengthened
as the quality of governance deteriorates. Still, the significance test shows that the explanatory power of
the variables VA, LV, and RB is somewhat questionable. Méon & Sekkat (2005) also casts doubts on VA
and RB, but finds some support to SWH when LV is concerned.
The estimates including GE and RL seem  more  robust,  as  the  impacts  of  corruption,  and  those  of  the
interaction terms on the dependent variable are always statistically significant (see Table 1). In contrast
with Méon & Sekkat (2005), the regressions yield strong support to GWH. The coefficients of both CPI
and WGI variables display positive and significant estimates (α3>0) saying that corruption encourages
growth in countries with shortcomings in government effectiveness (GE) or rule of law (RL), compared to
the rest of the countries in the sample. This is also confirmed by the negative and significant coefficients
of the interaction terms associated with GE and RL (α4<0). These estimates unequivocally say that
corruption  tends  to  boost  growth  as GE or RL degrades, which is exactly what the strict form of GWH
claims.
¹
83.2 Effects on capital accumulation
The estimation results of the effects of corruption on capital investments for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011
are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Variation of capital stock (with corruption and governance data of 2009-2011)
Explanatory
variables
PS PS & VA PS & LV PS & GE PS & RB PS & RL
WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI
Intercept     09
                   10
                   11
2.72*
(1.22)
2.78*
(1.25)
2.31.
(0.124)
2.36.
(1.26)
2.68*
(1.31)
2.57*
(1.26)
2.76*
(1.20)
2.90*
(1.23)
2.52*
(1.22)
2.55*
(1.23)
2.91*
(1.27)
2.70*
(1.22)
2.92*
(1.21)
3.00*
(1.25)
2.46*
(1.24)
2.56*
(1.25)
2.85*
(1.32)
2.65*
(1.27)
3.28**
(1.21)
3.28**
(1.24)
2.80*
(1.22)
2.70*
(1.25)
2.93*
(1.31)
2.86*
(1.27)
3.13*
(1.23)
3.15*
(1.27)
2.71*
(1.24)
2.59*
(1.28)
2.85*
(1.34)
2.78*
(1.29)
3.11**
(1.17)
3.14**
(1.21)
2.79*
(1.19)
2.56*
(1.22)
2.84*
(1.29)
2.91*
(1.25)
y0 09
                   10
                   11
-0.38***
(0.10)
-0.38***
(0.10)
-0.37***
(0.10)
-0.37***
(0.10)
-0.38***
(0.10)
-0.38***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.38***
(0.10)
-0.37***
(0.10)
-0.38***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.38***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.37***
(0.10)
-0.38***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.42***
(0.10)
-0.41***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.41***
(0.10)
-0.41***
(0.10)
-0.41***
(0.10)
-0.41***
(0.10)
-0.41***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.39***
(0.10)
-0.40***
(0.10)
-0.42***
(0.10)
-0.43***
(0.10)
-0.42***
(0.10)
-0.42***
(0.10)
-0.43***
(0.10)
-0.43***
(0.10)
Education   09
                   10
                   11
0.91*
(0.42)
0.84.
(0.44)
0.95*
(0.45)
0.96*
(0.43)
0.85.
(0.44)
0.93*
(0.45)
1.24**
(0.45)
1.19*
(0.47)
1.35**
(0.48)
1.43**
(0.45)
1.37**
(0.46)
1.52**
(0.48)
0.80.
(0.42)
0.73
(0.44)
0.85.
(0.46)
0.90*
(0.42)
0.78.
(0.44)
0.89.
(0.46)
0.45
(0.46)
0.34
(0.48)
0.42
(0.49)
0.59
(0.46)
0.49
(0.49)
0.62
(0.51)
0.63
(0.45)
0.58
(0.47)
0.61
(0.49)
0.78.
(0.46)
0.72
(0.48)
0.77
(0.50)
0.50
(0.42)
0.44
(0.44)
0.51
(0.45)
0.63
(0.43)
0.54
(0.45)
0.61
(0.47)
Openness    09
                   10
                   11
0.40**
(0.14)
0.40**
(0.14)
0.42**
(0.14)
0.40**
(0.14)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.40**
(0.14)
0.36*
(0.14)
0.36*
(0.14)
0.37**
(0.14)
0.34*
(0.13)
0.33*
(0.14)
0.34*
(0.14)
0.34*
(0.14)
0.36*
(0.14)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.34*
(0.14)
0.36*
(0.14)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.38**
(0.14)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.40**
(0.14)
0.37**
(0.14)
0.38**
(0.14)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.41**
(0.14)
0.38**
(0.14)
0.38**
(0.14)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.38**
(0.13)
0.39**
(0.14)
0.40**
(0.14)
0.36**
(0.13)
0.38**
(0.14)
0.38**
(0.14)
WGI           09
                   10
                   11
0.02
(0.27)
0.01
(0.27)
0.18
(0.28)
-0.86
(0.55)
-0.98*
(0.58)
-0.93
(0.60)
0.84
(0.54)
0.74
(0.57)
0.65
(0.57)
1.41*
(0.64)
1.52*
(0.69)
1.72*
(0.71)
0.88
(0.59)
0.80
(0.62)
1.15*
(0.66)
1.92**
(0.65)
1.99**
(0.70)
2.33**
(0.72)
CPI             09
                   10
                   11
0.14
(0.22)
0.08
(0.23)
0.13
(0.22)
-0.76.
(0.40)
-0.92*
(0.41)
-0.89*
(0.40)
0.66
(0.39)
0.46
(0.41)
0.28
(0.40)
1.07*
(0.54)
0.86
(0.54)
0.75
(0.52)
0.55
(0.46)
0.35
(0.47)
0.43
(0.47)
1.46**
(0.51)
1.18*
(0.54)
1.15*
(0.52)
Table 2 continues on the next page.
9Table 2 continued.
WGI*VA    09
                   10
                   11
0.60.
(0.33)
0.67*
(0.34)
0.72*
(0.35)
CPI*VA     09
                   10
                   11
0.56**
(0.21)
0.631**
(0.22)
0.66**
(0.22)
WGI*LV    09
                   10
                   11
-0.54.
(0.30)
-0.48
(0.32)
-0.31
(0.33)
CPI*LV      09
                   10
                   11
-0.32
(0.20)
-0.24
(0.21)
-0.10
(0.21)
WGI*GE    09
                   10
                   11
-0.94*
(0.40)
-1.00*
(0.42)
-1.02*
(1.43)
CPI*GE      09
                   10
                   11
-0.55
(0.29)
-0.47
(0.29)
-0.39
(0.30)
WGI*RB    09
                   10
                   11
-0.61
(0.37)
-0.56
(0.39)
-0.67
(0.41)
CPI*RB      09
                   10
                   11
-0.27
(0.26)
-0.18
(0.27)
-0.20
(0.28)
WGI*RL    09
                   10
                   11
-1.21**
(0.38)
-1.24**
(0.41)
-1.35**
(0.42)
CPI*RL      09
                   10
                   11
-0.75**
(0.26)
-0.63*
(0.28)
-0.60*
(0.28)
N                09
                   10
                   11
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
117
115
116
114
112
113
Adj.-R2 09
                   10
                   11
0.193
0.194
0.203
0.207
0.206
0.214
0.216
0.220
0.232
0.253
0.260
0.271
0.214
0.208
0.209
0.225
0.214
0.216
0.230
0.231
0.239
0.232
0.223
0.226
0.211
0.207
0.221
0.214
0.209
0.218
0.257
0.253
0.267
0.259
0.240
0.245
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression variables with superscripts “***”, “**”, “*”, “.” indicating statistical significance
at 0, 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 % error level, respectively. GLS standard deviations are in parenthesis.
Table 2 shows that the signs of the estimates of the intercept terms are positive over the three years, and
significant with only one exception. Initial income y0 keeps its negative and significant coefficient,
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confirming again the conditional convergence hypothesis. The estimates of the control variables are
consistent (while not always significant) with the theory of the determinants of investment (Levine &
Renelt, 1992) saying that both human capital and trade liberalism should contribute positively to the
accumulation of capital stock. Méon & Sekkat (2005) reports similar results, but finds the estimate of
Openness insignificant.
In the preliminary specification of equation (2), the estimates of both corruption coefficients are always
positive, but small and never statistically significant. Méon & Sekkat (2005) reports negative and
significant findings in 1998, but in the current sample and over the three years, no clear linkage between
corruption and capital accumulation exists. Thus, the SWH-GWH dilemma remains unresolved. Taking the
quality of governance into account (that is β4 0), there is only modest changes in the estimates on the
control variables. All enter the regressions with their expected signs, but the positive effect of human capital
becomes less meaningful. On the other hand, the positive estimates of the corruption coefficients gain more
weight and significance. Overall, the explanatory power of the estimations improves compared to the
preliminary specification.
Again, the estimates on the particular governance variables vary. Those regarding LV or RB do not establish
a clear relationship between corruption and the variation of capital stock. The corruption coefficients are
positive and those of the interaction terms are negative, but both are statistically insignificant. Thus, it
cannot be determined how corruption affects the capital stock in countries where LV or RB is unsatisfactory.
Considering VA, the estimations give partial support to SWH. In 2010 and 2011, the estimates for the CPI
coefficients are negative and significant, and the estimates of the coefficients of the corresponding
interaction terms are positive and significant. The respective coefficients regarding WGI are less definitive.
Yet, in countries with weak VA, corruption seems to hinder investment, and the effect gets worse as VA
declines further.
The estimations with respect to GE and especially RL give again notable support for GWH. Both corruption
coefficients get positive and significant estimates, while those of the interaction variables are negative and
significant, especially with RL. This indicates that the lower the quality of governance, measured in terms
of GE or RL, the more corruption fosters capital accumulation. This is exactly what strict GWH claims.
The results differ markedly from Méon & Sekkat (2005), which omits RB and VA, and finds clear support
for SWH when RL, GE or LV is considered as the indicator of the quality of governance.
4 Recursive tests
Méon & Sekkat (2005) provides recursive tests as ‘preliminary investigations’ of the impacts of corruption
with respect to the quality of governance by estimating corruption coefficients sequentially over sub-
samples which gradually include countries with better and better quality. The test results are illustrated by
plotting the estimated corruption coefficients against the quality of governance. The strict form of SWH is
supported, because all plots lay in the negative area and compound a clearly rising trend. Support for strict
GWH would have necessitated a falling trend on the positive area. To be sure, the results of the investigation
are then confirmed by regular estimations (corresponding to those in Section 3 of this paper). No
controversy between the two sets of results is found.
Here, recursive tests and regular estimations are used in reverse order: the tests are used to better understand
the results of Section 3. The recursive tests are based on the preliminary specifications of equations (1) and
(2), that is at α4, β4 =0. Instead of using the interaction terms, sub-sampling technique is used to tackle the
¹
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effect of the quality of governance. The tests are made for the year 2009 with WGI as the corruption index,
and RL and GE as the governance indicators.
4.1 GDP growth
Following Méon & Sekkat (2005), countries in the whole sample are ranked from the lowest to the highest
quality of governance, measured by the original scores of RL and GE. For both indicators, sub-samples are
constructed so that the first sub-sample includes 90 observations of countries with the lowest scores (that
is countries from the lowest up to the 90th lowest), the second sub-sample covers observations from the 2nd
lowest to the 91st lowest score, and so on. Thus, there are 28 sub-samples in total, of which the last one
includes countries from the 90th best to the one with the absolutely best quality score. Figure 1 plots the
coefficients of the corruption from the sequential estimations based on the sub-samples.
Figure 1: Estimated impact of corruption on GDP per capita according to RL and GE in the whole sample
In Figure 1, the upward trend of both of the plotted curves unequivocally supports SWH by showing that
the negative effect of corruption on GDP growth gradually diminishes with the improvement of RL and
GE. This accords with Méon & Sekkat (2005, Figure 2 and Table 2), and with this paper’s preliminary
estimation results in Table 1, panel a, column PS. However, the finding is not in line with the estimation
results presented in the GE and RL related columns of Table 1, panel a (whereas there is no such disparity
of results in Méon & Sekkat, 2005). The disparity is because all estimates from the sequential estimations
are based on almost 77 % observations of the whole sample thus including an overwhelming amount of
countries with good quality of governance. Thus, the illustrative result of the preliminary investigation may
be intuitively appealing, but it does not suffice to assess the validity of either SWH or GWH. In order to
explain the diverging results of Figure 1 and Table 1, panel a, the sampling technique must be refined.
For closer scrutiny on the role of governmental quality, the whole 2009 sample of 117 countries is divided
into three sample portions, denoted A, B, and C, ordered by the RL and GE quality measures. Thus, sample
portion A includes 39 observations of countries with the lowest quality scores, portion B includes 39
countries with medium quality, and portion C includes the remaining 39 countries with the highest quality
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scores. The resulting categorization into sample portions A, B, and C with reference to RL and GE is
reported country-wise in Appendix 1.
Furthermore, for each sample portion A, B and C, ten sub-portions are constructed to yield 30 sets of
observations for both RL and GE. Thus, in the low quality portion A, the first sub-portion A1 includes the
observations from the worst score up to the 30th, the second sub-portion A2 includes the observations from
the 2nd to the 31st, and so on. The same applies for sample portions B and C, too. Finally, based on the thus
generated sub-portions, sequential estimations are performed for each sample portion (A, B, and C) in the
same manner as for the sub-samples of the whole sample. Figures 1.A, 1.B, and 1.C below plot the
successive coefficients of corruption (α3) that result from the sequential estimations of sample portions A,
B, and C, respectively. Estimations with respect to RL and GE are plotted one upon the other within the
same co-ordinates.
Figure 1.A: Effects of corruption in sample portion A
Figure 1.A shows the marginal impacts of corruption on GDP per capita in countries that record the lowest
levels of the quality of governance in terms of RL and GE (sample portion A). Regarding the GE related
curve, the estimates of the effect of corruption on GDP growth are systematically positive throughout sub-
portions  A1–10,  with  an  average  of  1.252.  The  shape  of  the  curve  also  hints  that  the  positive  effect  of
corruption on GDP growth would diminish as the quality of governance improves. In fact, the average of
the coefficients in the first half of the sample portion (A1-5) is 1.332, while the average in the latter half
(A6-10) is 1.171. Thus, the strict form of GWH holds. As to RL, the test remains more blurry, because the
corruption coefficients in sub-portions from A1 to A5 are markedly positive (1.128 in average), but those
in sub-portions from A6 to A10 are slightly negative (-0.224 in average). However, as the average over
A1–10 is clearly positive (0.452), GWH is considerably supported.
Figure 1.B illustrates  the  estimation  results  in  sample  portion  B  that  is  among  countries  with  medium
quality of governance.
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Figure 1.B: Effects of corruption in sample portion B
Figure 1.B shows that, along the RL related curve, the coefficients of corruption are always notably positive
with the average of 1.513. This speaks for GWH, although the positive effect rather strengthens than
diminishes (the B1-5 average is 1.325 while the B6-10 average is 1.700) with the improvement of the
quality  of  governance,  which  is  in  contrast  with  the  strict  form  of  GWH.  With  respect  to  government
efficiency, the test remains inconclusive. The GE plots show that corruption seems to cause negative effects
on GDP growth throughout the first half of the sample portion (-1.134 in average) and positive effects in
the latter half (0.709 in average). The average effect of corruption over the sub-portions B1–10 remains
negative (-0.212).
Figure 1.C plots  the  estimation  results  among  countries  with  the  highest  rankings  of  the  quality  of
governance (sample portion C).
Figure 1.C: Effects of corruption in sample portion C
Figure 1.C shows that the test remains unconvincing, because the effects of corruption are relatively small
with both rule of law and government efficiency. The curve based on RL now stays mostly in the negative
area, and the average impact is -0.012 over sub-portions C1–10 (–0.007 within C1-5, and -0.017 within C6-
10).  Thus,  there  is  weak  support  for  SWH,  but  not  in  its  strict  form.  On the  other  hand,  the GE related
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coefficients stay more clearly in the positive area, albeit the average effect 0.079 over C1-10 is also very
low. The GE curve also has a slightly decreasing slope (the averages being 0.093 within C1-5 and 0.065
within C6-10). With respect to GE, the weak support comes in favor of GWH, even in its strict form.
The comparison of Figures 1.A, 1.B and 1.C helps to comprehend the SWH-GWH dilemma. Monitoring
the average values of the corruption effects through sample portions A, B, and C helps in making qualitative
assessments on the issue. That the average of the RL related corruption estimates first jumps from 0.452 in
sample portion A to 1.513 in portion B, and then falls to -0.012 in portion C suggests an interior solution,
that is a certain growth maximizing quality level (possibly within the range of medium quality), after which
the beneficial effects of corruption turn detrimental. This accords with Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006), which
finds evidence for a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and growth. The respective moves of
the GE averages are from 1.251 in sample portion A to -0.212 in portion B and to 0.079 in portion C. This
seems more like a corner solution with the rough implication that the worse the quality of governance the
better corruption serves growth, which is the standard GHW claim of a monotonic relationship between
corruption and growth. In any case, the conclusion is that GWH is strongly supported. The conclusion is
also in line with the estimation results at α4 0 in chapter 3.1 (Table 1, panel a, the GE ad RL related
columns).
4.2 Capital accumulation
The estimations of equation (2) reported in Table 2 above indicate that, from the whole sample perspective,
the SWH-GWH dilemma remains unresolved, but that the incorporation of RL and GE yields support for
GWH. Following the same ‘preliminary investigation’ procedure as with Figure 1 above, Figure 2 plots
the estimates of the effect of corruption on capital accumulation over the whole sample (at β4=0) with
reference to RL and GE.
Figure 2: Estimated impact of corruption on capital stock according to RL and GE in the whole sample
The rising shapes of the two curves in Figure 2 seem to suggest that the negative effect of corruption
becomes less distortive to investments as the quality of governance gets better. In Méon & Sekkat (2005,
Figure 2) this is very clear, because the rising RL curve always stays in the negative area. However, the RL
and GE curves of Figure 2 eventually strike through the zero line from below, which reflects the
¹
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contradicting estimation results of chapter 3.2 (see Table 2, panel a). Thus, the result presented by Figure
2 does not shed light to the SWH-GWH debate, and closer scrutiny is again needed.
In order to dig deeper, the same refinement is done on the sampling technique as in the previous chapter.
Figures 2.A, 2.B and 2.C below illustrate the estimation results in the three analogously constructed sample
portions, A, B, and C (the categorization of countries is also presented in Appendix 1). Figure 2.1 presents
the results of the sequential estimations in the first sample portion A.
Figure 2.A: Effects of corruption in sample portion A
Figure 2.A plots the effects of corruption on capital stock in countries experiencing the lowest levels of RL
and GE. Practically all estimates are in the negative area saying that the detrimental effects of corruption
outweigh the beneficial ones. For RL, the average effects of corruption on capital accumulation are -0.698
within A1-5, -0.240 within A6-10, and -0.469 over all sub-portions A1–10. For GE, the respective averages
are -2.246 within A1-5, -1.692 within A6-10, and -1.969 over the whole sub-portion A. Both observations
give support to SWH, and especially so from the part of GE,  which  also  depicts  a  clearly  rising  trend.
Figure 2.B presents the estimation results in sample portion B (medium quality).
Figure 2.B: Effects of corruption in sample portion B
2 4 6 8 10
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Quality of governance
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
te
st
im
at
es
fo
rW
G
I
-3
-2
-1
0
1
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
te
st
im
at
es
fo
rW
G
I
RL
GE GWH
SWH
2 4 6 8 10
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Quality of governance
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
te
st
im
at
es
fo
rW
G
I
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
te
st
im
at
es
fo
rW
G
I
RL
GE
GWH
SWH
16
In Figure 2.B, the situation is somewhat changed from that in Figure 2.A. The marginal effects of corruption
on capital stock with reference to RL are now clearly positive, and the average effect over B1-10 is 1.504.
Thus, GWH gets support, albeit the curve does not have a decreasing trend (since the average within B1-5
is 1.407, and that within B6-10 is 1.602). With respect to GE, the change from sample portion A is a bit
smaller. The curve remains mainly in the negative area with a rising trend (the average within B1-5 is -
1.543, and that within B6-10 is 0.371) thus speaking in favor of SWH, and the average effect of corruption
over B1-10 is now only -0.586. Figure 2.C shows the estimation results in sample portion C (high quality
of governance).
Figure 2.C: Effects of corruption in sample portion C
The first conclusion from Figure 2.C is that GWH gets support. The estimated coefficients are relatively
small, but they stay mostly in the positive area for both RL and GE. The evidence from the GE graph is
particularly convincing, because the coefficient averages are all positive and decline from the first to the
second half of portion C (0.650 within C1-5, 0.538 within C6-10, and 0.594 within C1-10). On the other
hand, the RL curve now strikes through the zero line from below, and the coefficient averages are 0.000
within C1-5, 0.472 within C6-10, and only 0.235 over the whole sample portion C. Thus, GWH gets some
support, but the rising trend is in contrast with its strict interpretation.
Comparison of Figures 2.A, 2.B and 2.C shows that, when moving from the low quality end towards the
high quality end, both RL and GE related plots shift from the negative to the positive area thus cohering
with Figure 2. The GE average goes from -1.969 in sample portion A through -0.586 in portion B to 0.594
in portion C thus speaking for a SWH-type corner solution. This seems to contradict the conclusion from
the estimations in chapter 3.2., but recall that in Table 2, the estimate (-0.55) of the respective interaction
term (CPI*GE-09) is not statistically significant. Thus, there remains some uncertainty in the interpretation
of the effect.
Meanwhile, the average of the RL plots goes from -0.469 in sample portion A through 1.504 in portion B
to 0.235 in portion C. This suggests again an interior solution somewhere between the poorest and the best
quality  of  governance.  Thus,  the  non-monotonic  GWH  result  of  Méndez  & Sepúlveda (2006) is again
supported. This may be due to the claimed positive effects of corruption on the productivity of capital. For
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example, Leff (1964) claims that licenses tend to get allocated to the most efficient firms, Bardhan (1997)
suggests that corruption may pave the way to entrepreneurship, and Beck & Maher (1986) shows that the
lowest-cost firm always wins the bribery game. The result sheds some light also on the puzzling result of
Méon & Weill (2008) that corruption unambiguously enhances aggregate efficiency. In any case, it can be
concluded that GWH cannot be rejected in the context of capital accumulating investments.
5 Conclusions
The paper tests whether the Sanding the Wheels Hypothesis (SWH) or Greasing the Wheels Hypothesis
(GWH) is valid in a broad sample of countries. The main idea behind SWH is that corruption causes various
kinds of economic distortions that hamper economic growth and development. GWH, on the other hand, is
reasoned by possible virtues that corruption may have in bypassing malfunctioning bureaucracy and flawed
governance. The paper tackles Méon & Sekkat (2005), which reports unambiguous support for strict SWH
that is particularly in those countries with bad governance.
The preliminary estimations show that the average impact of corruption on GDP growth is negative in the
whole sample. This would corroborate SWH. On the other hand, the relationship between corruption and
capital accumulation remains ambiguous, whereas Méon & Sekkat (2005) finds it also negative.
Adding the interaction between the quality of governance and corruption makes the estimation results differ
more drastically from those of Méon & Sekkat (2005). In particular, the negative estimates of the corruption
variables turn overall positive, while those of Méon & Sekkat (2005) gain growing negative values. Thus,
the interpretation concerning the role of the quality of governance is here reversed. Furthermore, the
estimations including rule of law (RL) and governmental efficiency (GE) give sound support for strict
GWH. The results are unambiguous about the positive effect of corruption on growth and investments with
both RL and GE, while the investment effect remains somewhat ambiguous with GE.
The recursive tests clarify the picture further. Considering the effect of corruption on GDP growth with
respect to RL gives reason to argue for an interior solution that is  a certain growth maximizing level of
governmental quality after which corruption turns from beneficial to detrimental. This is in line with
Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006), which finds evidence for a non-monotonic relationship between corruption
and growth. The respective analysis concerning GE points to a corner solution implying that the worse
governmental quality is the better corruption serves growth, which is the strict GHW claim of a monotonic
relationship between corruption and growth. The general conclusion is that GWH is supported.
Considering the effects of corruption on capital accumulation with respect to RL, an interior GWH solution
is again supported, but the results from the GE viewpoint are more obscure because of the remaining
uncertainty in the estimations. The recursive tests also show that the GWH evidence for capital
accumulation appears in better quality countries than that for GDP growth. This hints that governance must
be reasonably well functioning for corruption to promote economically rational investments.
All in all, GWH cannot be rejected and corruption cannot be totally banned. Corruption may be harmful as
such, but in a second best world with pre-existing distortions it may still be beneficial. Moreover, the paper
pinpoints  the  crucial  flaws  of  governance,  namely  rule  of  law  and  government  efficiency.  The  policy
implication is that the effort must be put rather on correcting these deeply rooted distortions by developing
legislation and administration than on the plain fight against corruption.
18
A noteworthy implication for further study is that  the answer to the SWH-GWH debate is  not only data
dependent but that it also necessitates more sophisticated modelling. There must be other channels for
corruption to enhance growth besides that through accumulation of physical capital. This may happen, say,
via the accumulation of human and social capital, or via other means that improve aggregate efficiency,
which is the channel demonstrated by Méon & Weill (2008). These aspects with special emphasis on the
non-monotonic interplay between corruption and growth, investments, and aggregate efficiency should be
well worthy of deeper analysis.
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Appendix 1: List of countries/territories in the sample and their original governance and corruption scores (Sources:
World Bank/Transparency International). Example: “AlbaniaA/B” means that this country belongs to sample A
according to RL categorization, and sample B according to GE categorization.
Country/
Territory
VA09/10/11 LV09/10/11 GE09/10/11 RB09/10/11 RL09/10/11 WGI09/10/11 CPI09/10/11
AlbaniaA/B 0.1265989
0.1120576
0.0503021
-0.0512325
-0.1913142
-0.2885557
-0.2389934
-0.2714275
-0.2014628
0.2476654
0.2322520
0.2352432
-0.5325828
-0.4357594
-0.4853281
-0.4932783
-0.4885777
-0.6473622
3.2
3.3
3.1
ArgentinaA/B 0.2447101
0.3302365
0.3156912
-0.2351244
-0.0872479
0.1394252
-0.3260052
-0.1901374
-0.1365987
-0.8462042
-0.7578310
-0.7226772
-0.7088902
-0.6207297
-0.5874928
-0.5036001
-0.4135072
-0.4011729
2.9
2.9
3
AustraliaC/C 1.4039058
1.4434738
1.4773411
0.8269657
0.8713911
0.9297624
1.6981726
1.7699273
1.6979498
1.8169361
1.6917941
1.8523644
1.7319517
1.7632095
1.7414312
2.0783314
2.0442385
2.0801420
8.7
8.7
8.5
AustriaC/C 1.4185192
1.4658701
1.4326834
1.1659884
1.1237210
1.1786493
1.6736235
1.8381406
1.6122803
1.4648699
1.4662598
1.3949937
1.7870105
1.8057999
1.8107110
1.7640095
1.6266258
1.4448040
7.9
7.9
7.8
BahrainB/B -0.7990285
-0.9716967
-1.2221702
-0.1627256
-0.5065861
-0.9601011
0.4961031
0.4839480
0.5467648
0.7138539
0.7320066
0.7432290
0.5532317
0.4800778
0.3918324
0.2415089
0.2490037
0.2363450
5.1
4.9
5.1
BangladeshA/A -0.3013690
-0.2811644
-0.3225063
-1.5410822
-1.3987305
-1.3929703
-0.7869006
-0.7466357
-0.7585509
-0.8458747
-0.8340193
-0.8013586
-0.7737407
-0.7863807
-0.7117915
-1.0272481
-1.0232698
-1.0468478
2.4
2.4
2.7
BarbadosC/C 1.2013690
1.2091648
1.1869115
1.0644525
1.0938162
1.2782853
1.5051937
1.4134511
1.4641999
0.5313724
0.4500823
0.6013535
0.9734522
1.0438891
1.0412560
1.3341261
1.4361289
1.7647067
7.4
7.8
7.8
BelgiumC/C 1.3646447
1.3819248
1.3432687
0.7921069
0.7815902
0.9346927
1.5870964
1.5815514
1.6597028
1.3222391
1.2903933
1.2445455
1.3555488
1.3698656
1.4036214
1.4279661
1.4940935
1.5597021
7.1
7.1
7.5
BelizeB/B 0.7480527
0.6757314
0.6749200
0.0278336
0.0636423
0.1463829
-0.4726605
-0.4396821
-0.3610856
-0.4698008
-0.4459726
-0.5359116
-0.3753379
-0.3588986
-0.4933625
-0.0406341
-0.0817510
-0.2602550
...
…
…
BeninA/A 0.3265036
0.2887886
0.1368682
0.3752901
0.2222993
0 .2933429
-0.5561426
-0.5782274
-0.5323104
-0.3287827
-0.3235309
-0.3348654
-0.6733479
-0.7006985
-0.7134449
-0.6727116
-0.7376142
-0.6341435
2.9
2.8
3
BoliviaA/A -0.0306159
-0.0739392
-0.1019865
-0.5297799
-0.4445233
-0.4437194
-0.5928143
-0.5030620
-0.4633995
-0.8557431
-0.7869012
-0.7417715
-1.1375538
-1.0538486
-1.0085624
-0.6312029
-0.4423157
-0.5339831
2.7
2.8
2.8
BotswanaC/B 0.4213548
0.4420506
0.3958006
0.9319792
0.9607075
1.0505356
0.4829932
0.4635652
0.4619562
0.4844399
0.4561550
0.5003294
0.6548729
0.6662079
0.6650270
0.9195151
1.0033346
0.9882779
5.6
5.8
6.1
BrazilB/B 0.4865210
0.5297380
0.4735872
0.1643639
0.0057122
-0.1363690
-0.0956505
-0.0393811
-0.1178521
0.1095366
0.1644911
0.1771274
-0.2171707
-0.0037492
-0.0058928
-0.1167837
-0.0006795
0.1456659
3.7
3.7
3.8
Brunei
DarussalamC/C
-0.7459926
-0.6514749
-0.5995606
1.3635690
1.2403291
1.0950062
0.9411171
0.8992627
0.8872761
1.1039384
1.1234875
1.1760467
0.7951535
0.7929224
0.8713961
1.0202091
0.8947635
0.8751502
5.5
5.6
5.2
BulgariaB/B 0.5557074
0.5241060
0.4395235
0.3184204
0.3274322
0.2790123
0.1613308
0.1104217
0.1086238
0.6620950
0.6410076
0.5372283
-0.0738960
-0.1039492
-0.1367129
-0.2471227
-0.2069802
-0.2250355
3.8
3.6
3.3
BurundiA/A -0.7096075
-0.9434164
-0.9448452
-1.2675714
-1.5960978
-1.7848533
-1.0294101
-1.1004065
-1.0856076
-1.1479775
-1.1045552
-0.9998989
-1.1643437
-1.1903488
-1.1329580
-1.0675523
-1.1056302
-1.1349526
1.8
1.8
1.9
CambodiaA/A -0.9112024
-0.9260100
-0.9107930
-0.5873427
-0.5417823
-0.3272548
-0.9102455
-0.9242123
-0.8502222
-0.4736017
-0.4618946
-0.5705897
-1.0856301
-1.0895602
-1.0223165
-1.1589940
-1.2323845
-1.2182861
2
2.1
2.1
CameroonA/A -1.0619175
-1.0797361
-1.0459890
-0.4820484
-0.7268565
-0.6613228
-0.8185738
-0.8750547
-0.8739234
-0.7398507
-0.7257782
-0.7898504
-1.1152772
-1.0523128
-1.0571951
-0.9223456
-0.9846665
-1.0741826
2.2
2.2
2.5
CanadaC/C 1.4285032
1.3756983
1.4056061
1.0967020
0.9037905
1.0611191
1.7523437
1.7882252
1.7779760
1.6972243
1.6895374
1.6847854
1.8058612
1.8098323
1.7429635
2.0833239
2.0968079
1.9993255
8.7
8.9
8.7
Central African
RepublicA/A
-1.0063691
-1.1234595
-1.1076943
-1.8827085
-2.0119109
-1.7849242
-1.4225785
-1.3902735
-1.2779517
-1.2534358
-1.1516927
-1.1786459
-1.3206812
-1.2939292
-1.2720955
-0.9074397
-0.8361163
-0.8436344
...
…
…
ChileC/C 1.0088415
1.0915977
1.0755788
0.5927134
0.6748260
0.4591399
1.2306654
1.2611789
1.2561986
1.4800742
1 .4562134
1.4758220
1.2657794
1.3221518
1.3580543
1.3502798
1.4859126
1.5230313
6.7
7.2
7.2
ChinaB/B -1.6571604
-1.6316169
-1.5832601
-0.428204
-0.6571777
-0.6063860
0.1134911
0.1021213
0.0954512
-0.2016862
-0.2187211
-0.2098415
-0.3218533
-0.3288297
-0.3912694
-0.5433449
-0.5958467
-0.5554175
3.6
3.5
3.6
ColombiaB/B -0.1599145
-0.1538632
-0.0902152
-1.8311153
-1.5323072
-1.2654761
-0.2289401
-0.0428464
0.0639427
0.1519475
0.2582385
0.3679736
-0.4273221
-0.3454352
-0.2860052
-0.3054511
-0.4086259
-0.3001152
3.7
3.5
3.4
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Congo,
Republic of A/A
-1.0994035
-1.0575951
-1.1045879
-0.2774469
-0.3304975
-0.3616942
-1.2350144
-1.2339884
-1.1966785
-1.2816084
-1.2672029
-1.2594231
-1.1885554
-1.1833568
-1.1615811
-1.1754363
-1.1149697
-1.0782952
1.9
2.1
2.2
Costa RicaB/B 0.9990097
1.0385227
1.0398352
0.5718901
0.6851660
0.6851660
0.3287033
0.3287033
0.3141529
0.3431884
0.4563459
0.5042729
0.5342077
0.5342077
0.4882818
0.4232355
0.7057902
0.6478212
5.3
5.3
4.8
Côte
d’IvoireA/A
-1.1111903
-1.0966356
-1.1281301
-1.2847657
-1.5658675
-1.4045841
-1.0814440
-1.2602875
-1.1205446
-0.9499763
-0.9124377
-0.8580213
-1.2628682
-1.2363500
-1.2898006
-1.0819079
-1.1378797
-1.0362312
2.1
2.2
2.2
CyprusC/C 1.0779166
1.0779166
1.0220048
1.0532475
0.3792575
0.5983886
0.5983886
1.4305818
1.5288684
1.5644798
1.3739506
1.2373296
1.1907930
1.1959749
1.0531340
0.9328679
1.0047795
0.8871522
6.6
6.3
6.3
Democratic
Republic of the
CongoA/A
-1.4474422
-1.4446722
-1.5156416
-1.9873279
-2.2271516
-2.2369108
-1.7051832
-1.7349410
-1.6733869
-1.5291693
-1.5823006
-1.5198329
-1.6297209
-1.6121451
-1.6061502
-1.3634680
-1.4180767
-1.3963909
1.9
2
2
DenmarkC/C 1.5710489
1.5820599
1.5977822
0.9731678
1.0307446
1.1006886
2.2292788
2.0936598
2.1109986
1.8962008
1.8841549
1.9114117
1.9211004
1.8966164
1.9284000
2.5193676
2.4135639
2.4525077
9.3
9.3
9.4
Dominican
RepublicA/A
0.0574986
0.0341533
0.0555231
-0.0104966
-0.0687154
-0.0133375
-0.6104328
-0.6614285
-0.5848188
-0.1913703
-0.1452541
-0.1883350
-0.7632327
-0.8022168
-0.7550654
-0.7230680
-0.8076913
-0.7643871
3
3
2.6
EcuadorA/A -0.2759430
-0.2602430
-0.3241090
-0.6832963
-0.6215849
-0.7144565
-0.7777221
-0.7169513
-0.5865280
-1.2794593
-1.1602264
-1.0240697
-1.2521972
-1.2072801
-1.2134237
-0.8868925
-0.8613360
-0.7939191
2.2
2.5
2.7
EgyptB/B -1.1214361
-1.1470557
-1.1288076
-0.6194138
-0.9085869
-1.4470433
-0.2733011
-0.3763946
-0.5360022
-0.1875817
-0.1565823
-0.3265258
-0.0598440
-0.1153314
-0.4003763
-0.4187502
-0.5498520
-0.6599932
2.8
3.1
2.9
El SalvadorA/B 0.0473479
0.0543115
0.0170261
-0.0213150
0.0557529
0.1141213
-0.0189458
0.0024754
-0.1073956
0.3532253
0.3757462
0.4876372
-0.8004014
-0.8674402
-0.7573447
-0.1957092
-0.2338723
-0.2115938
3.4
3.6
3.4
FijiA/A -0.7801483
-1.0011466
-0.9808722
-0.2578577
-0.1539511
-0.0513160
-0.9087567
-0.7270969
-0.7111564
-0.9533885
-0.6693059
-0.5016015
-0.7563208
-0.8466668
-0.8206864
-0.7396603
-0.8490893
-0.4440961
...
…
…
FinlandC/C 1.4948029
1.5234532
1.5480285
1.4251066
1.3926494
1.3740606
2.2379028
2.2452116
2.2583038
1.8327659
1.8868588
1.8293492
1.9741289
1.9767785
1.9556539
2.3030128
2.1819584
2.2187564
8.9
9.2
9.4
FranceC/C 1.2433812
1.2017921
1.1666493
0.4747641
0.6707894
0.5933103
1.4931977
1.4474401
1.3723990
1.2131203
1.3076065
1.1492563
1.4274542
1.5115292
1.4397891
1.4174041
1.4359748
1.5219893
6.9
6.8
7
GabonA/A -1.0006707
-0.8876721
-0.9331597
0.1248124
0.2979316
0.3870336
-0.7543981
-0.7833404
-0.8040120
-0.5945622
-0.5656571
-0.5590690
-0.5492871
-0.5144128
-0.4489677
-0.9416733
-0.7803832
-0.7862082
2.9
2.8
3
GambiaB/A -1.0126047
-1.0851955
-1.2215512
0.1437357
0.0797288
0.0067038
-0.6277015
-0.6559684
-0.6055374
-0.3221126
-0.3831659
-0.2675029
-0.4433269
-0.5105978
-0.5060119
-0.5638038
-0.5596552
-0.4987613
2.9
3.2
3.5
GermanyC/C 1.3453322
1.3102837
1.3659296
0.8345506
0.7848618
0.8377121
1.5867574
1.5659327
1.5477759
1.5257831
1.5775310
1.5556707
1.6397396
1.6158680
1.6072758
1.7230968
1.7368941
1.7091935
8
7.9
8
GhanaB/B 0.4868556
0.4927358
0.4588853
0.0359192
0.0237016
0.1573364
-0.0378100
-0.0392845
-0.0515221
0.0901794
0.1238879
0.1312108
-0.0768065
-0.0630011
-0.0386389
0.0313423
0.0597239
0.0478245
3.9
4.1
3.9
GreeceC/C 0.8620226
0.8796460
0.8023688
-0.2239698
-0.1317059
-0.0997927
0.6146594
0.5479233
0.5023763
0.8177834
0.6426160
0.5057075
0.6193619
0.6050667
0.5480496
0.0077841
-0.1581794
-0.1846279
3.8
3.5
3.4
Guatemala A/A -0.2740446
-0.3344646
-0.3411244
-0.9443116
-0.8731414
-0.7655390
-0.6938183
-0.6987481
-0.6994472
-0.1182254
-0.1302820
-0.1119975
-1.0729901
-0.9988156
-1.0580755
-0.4781287
-0.4812993
-0.4700800
3.4
3.2
2.7
HondurasA/A -0.5511761
-0.5133938
-0.4874289
-0.3304113
-0.5377914
-0.4262376
-0.6662774
-0.6403038
-0.5489020
-0.2642721
-0.2069361
-0.1155411
-0.9217928
-0.8852391
-0.9237212
-0.8688748
-0.8656970
-0.7961842
2.5
2.4
2.6
Hong KongC/C 0.4670424
0.5050491
0.5659192
0.9268124
0.8849168
0.9186050
1.7438263
1.6971417
1.6677237
1.8526358
1.9080837
1.8002624
1.4830129
1.5390791
1.5501148
1.8965748
1.9741591
1.8608856
8.2
8.4
8.4
HungaryC/C 0.9028832
0.9004918
0.8471132
0.5171686
0.6704437
0.7347599
0.6768618
0.6655406
0.6751831
1.0803200
1.0172439
1.0293837
0.7586851
0.7475842
0.7449156
0.3412201
0.2524087
0.3192020
5.1
4.7
4.6
IcelandC/C 1.4445850
1.4816958
1.4463238
1.1761394
1.0095074
1.2309099
1.6547380
1.5928989
1.5765985
1.0047094
0.8836492
1.0090428
1.7053052
1.6975963
1.6767243
2.0569424
1.9374301
1.9461077
8.7
8.5
8.3
IndiaB/B 0.4501788
0.4279142
0.4208199
-1.3283314
-1.2331525
-1.2961640
-0.0052090
0.0169612
-0.0050298
-0.3032303
-0.3691800
-0.3349846
0.0234900
-0.0413999
-0.1119011
-0.4773709
-0.5128427
-0.5728084
3.4
3.3
3.1
IndonesiaA/B -0.0336922
-0.0711832
-0.0376777
-0.7585163
-0.8538007
-0.7652453
-0.2765682
-0.1974721
-0.2488120
-0.3330929
-0.3946484
-0.3305923
-0.5951361
-0.6402983
-0.6077508
-0.8158257
-0.7454031
-0.6799344
2.8
2.8
3
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IranA/A -1.5533038
-1.5747575
-1.5499902
-1.5521520
-1.6201318
-1.4228550
-0.5738470
-0.4750221
-0.4395461
-1.7304923
-1.6950126
-1.5072622
-0.9443582
-0.9839990
-0.9405436
-0.8610210
-0.9913517
-0.9245688
1.8
2.2
2.7
IraqA/A -1.1000623
-1.0560930
-1.1351606
-2.1856992
-2.2555389
-1.8426450
-1.2020230
-1.2208051
-1.1507735
-1.0060865
-1.0501729
-1.0929888
-1.7741949
-1.6151213
-1.5143709
-1.3922886
-1.3101540
-1.2072050
1.5
1.5
1.8
IrelandC/C 1.3723953
1.3430035
1.3197278
1.0224077
0.9790665
0.9313718
1.3375402
1.3363370
1.4504491
1.7004084
1.6147474
1.5924390
1.7419176
1.7683802
1.7652595
1.7683807
1.6985143
1.5406835
8
8
7.5
IsraelC/C 0.5486457
0.5628886
0.6453261
-1.6230447
-1.3221223
-1.1924403
1.2601152
1.3679240
1.3295308
1.1089854
1.2249543
1.3225425
0.8225908
0.8987065
0.9992683
0.7495756
0.6680691
0.7123726
6.1
6.1
5.8
ItalyC/C 1.0250650
0.9516773
0.8983953
0.3405119
0.4740656
0.5057836
0.4246122
0.4462603
0.3793640
0.9451221
0.8921211
0.7137939
0.3509370
0.3782627
0.4206047
0.1251719
-0.0049817
0.0816871
4.3
3.9
3.9
JamaicaB/B 0.5482289
0.4154015
0.4269242
-0.3465410
-0.4060291
-0.0775001
0.2093722
0.1968695
0.2161098
0.2750856
0.2806513
0.3011560
-0.4843425
-0.4989186
-0.4248538
-0.4363029
-0.3756710
-0.2943780
3
3.3
3.3
JapanC/C 1.0175809
1.0367649
1.0700187
0.9363423
0.8543843
0.9843354
1.4609647
1.5222183
1.4690600
1.0902099
1.0257090
1.0800086
1.2970616
1.3257570
1.2954177
1.3718732
1.5730450
1.5677943
7.7
7.8
8
JordanB/B -0.7830679
-0.8021092
-0.7949714
-0.3559724
-0.3100980
-0.5165318
0.2810308
0.1317833
0.0952507
0.3068661
0.2504871
0.3006329
0.2801753
0.2026056
0.2597206
0.2201118
0.0647471
0.0956884
5
4.7
4.5
KenyaA/A -0.3371308
-0.2254792
-0.2748671
-1.4302234
-1.1697114
-1.2424445
-0.6028342
-0.5428418
-0.5733617
-0.1335880
-0.0742741
-0.2076156
-1.0506408
-0.9934090
-0.9522542
-1.0819967
-0.9357057
-0.9502148
2.2
2.1
2.2
Korea,
Republic of C/C
0.6930413
0.7299681
0.7165270
0.3797037
0.2860971
0.3890756
1.1103863
1.2173247
1.2590115
0.8392624
0.9371671
0.9921059
0.9777076
0.9900965
1.0229904
0.4832886
0.4016645
0.4612303
5.5
5.4
5.4
KuwaitC/B -0.4601744
-0.5063927
-0.5389334
0.3374360
0.4375881
0.2947349
0.2136727
0.1786713
0.0214070
0.1579301
0.1699209
0.0913686
0.6131631
0.6034204
0.5455459
0.4150271
0.3997512
0.1300760
4.1
4.5
4.6
LaosA/A -1.6441149
-1.6191784
-1.6154447
-0.1710512
-0.2731952
-0.0595255
-0.9567790
-0.8730940
-0.8486622
-1.0562578
-1.0125058
-0.9748938
-1.0047147
-0.9241769
-0.9466539
-1.2610820
-1.2068852
-1.1868718
2
2.1
2.2
LesothoB/B -0.1232531
-0.1398333
-0.1199080
0.3391543
0.4749986
0.3765703
-0.2895481
-0.3154894
-0.2860415
-0.6225507
-0.5967490
-0.6054568
-0.2305605
-0.3004618
-0.2721626
0.1598934
0.1781596
0.1752417
3.4
3.5
3.5
LiberiaA/A -0.2043335
-0.2592304
-0.3097794
-1.0754026
-0.4582324
-0.4238356
-1.2388153
-1.2697161
-1.2519524
-1.1912096
-1.0537198
-1.0947736
-1.0811713
-1.0117243
-0.9599565
-0.5627105
-0.5278384
-0.6157335
3.1
3.3
3.2
LuxembourgC/C 1.5357954
1.5591799
1.5945729
1.4236755
1.4414994
1.3145372
1.7454439
1.7103219
1.7373408
1.6586436
1.6930838
1.8605009
1.8174391
1.8314228
1.8017768
1.9853389
2.0631206
2.1677024
8.2
8.5
8.5
MacaoC/C 0.5751461
0.6139959
0.6020889
0.6003279
0.5491933
0.6063449
1.3180643
1.3247179
1.3086364
1.2706809
1.3388552
1.3288425
0.6840381
0.7041326
0.6901117
0.1650118
0.4284875
0.4634080
5.3
5.3
5.1
MalawiB/B -0.1617927
-0.2053070
-0.2646383
0.0503393
0.0556567
-0.0725231
-0.4657814
-0.4204137
-0.4417168
-0.4418672
-0.5756891
-0.7010721
-0.1233763
-0.1423996
-0.1787400
-0.3824303
-0.4574005
-0.3831895
3.4
3.4
3
MalaysiaB/C -0.4865076
-0.4771774
-0.4416501
-0.0702237
0.1225886
0.0809358
0.9952234
1.1289255
1.0285365
0.3075672
0.5946635
0.5875102
0.4878837
0.5263307
0.5199782
-0.0311586
0.1330046
0.0513854
4.5
4.4
4.3
MaldivesB/B -0.0846754
-0.0991614
-0.2046117
-0.2176021
-0.1295024
-0.2061499
-0.4534166
-0.2125017
-0.3074980
-0.4132637
-0.3957663
-0.4023034
-0.1684603
-0.3289847
-0.5726328
-0.6813964
-0.5262160
-0.5248277
2.5
2.3
2.5
MaliB/A 0.0418586
0.1343904
0.1544365
-0.0780520
-0.2077975
-0.6787787
-0.7896736
-0.8399364
-0.7844777
-0.3906196
-0.4792355
-0.3825396
-0.3503318
-0.4416826
-0.4946084
-0.6356813
-0.6507666
-0.5570901
2.8
2.7
2.8
MaltaC/C 1.1400840
1.1551215
1.1324293
1.2093473
1.2118144
1.0386052
1.1685818
1.1968619
1.2083010
1.3697855
1.4295687
1.3338224
1.4817337
1.4366155
1.3004140
0.8343579
0.8550025
0.8343635
5.2
5.6
5.6
MauritaniaA/A -0.9651089
-0.9511033
-0.9416400
-0.8776072
-1.0796040
-1.1686424
-0.8825936
-0.9629297
-0.9390950
-0.6714248
-0.8203942
-0.7711794
-0.7860354
-0.8679195
-0.8534024
-0.5560612
-0.6710209
-0.4536250
2.5
2.3
2.4
MauritiusC/C 0.8137077
0.7794566
0.7771756
0.6610594
0.5828140
0.9369315
0.7623692
0.8483137
0.8434717
0.8697070
0.8979968
0.8491420
0.9520711
0.8628253
0.8962007
0.6297062
0.6527594
0.5942903
5.4
5.4
5.1
MongoliaB/A 0.0914170
0.0445994
0.0032771
0.6015124
0.5904701
0.5998401
-0.6582975
-0.5723255
-0.5784618
-0.2767553
-0.2252177
-0.2047316
-0.2760956
-0.3861205
-0.2993519
-0.7553092
-0.7301729
-0.6756805
2.7
2.7
2.7
MoroccoB/B -0.7780303
-0.7279255
-0.7362639
-0.4104391
-0.3830172
-0.3945543
-0.1314648
-0.0905928
-0.1271821
-0.0483751
-0.0683286
-0.1058024
-0.1924256
-0.1568030
-0.2151445
-0.3091093
-0.1752992
-0.3974696
3.4
3.4
3.4
23
Continued
MozambiqueA/A -0.1059374
-0.1113841
-0.1908674
0.5895403
0.3437868
0.2955192
-0.5438292
-0.5735178
-0.6263377
-0.3867262
-0.3907478
-0.4234240
-0.5921087
-0.4712031
-0.5730944
-0.4210197
-0.4291821
-0.5002659
2.5
2.7
2.7
MexicoA/B 0.1752418
0.1513805
0.0946272
-0.6986821
-0.7387213
-0.6825855
0.1632934
0.1442436
0.3070609
0.2344021
0.2619131
0.292824
-0.6062816
-0.5777440
-0.5533280
-0.3010740
-0.3702896
-0.4013237
3.4
3.1
3
NepalA/A -0.4727785
-0.4813211
-0.4828552
-1.6230992
-1.5961890
-1.4229489
-0.9369090
-0.8606199
-0.8800888
-0.7006593
-0.7432949
-0.7222880
-0.9031954
-1.0081009
-0.9499320
-0.6517906
-0.6483138
-0.7403808
2.3
2.2
2.2
NigerA/A -0.7843500
-0.6682391
-0.2984977
-1.1566997
-1.1754146
-0.8717520
-0.6611185
-0.6656486
-0.6219311
-0.4824241
-0.5106096
-0.5252165
-0.5230668
-0.5205799
-0.4066666
-0.6085837
-0.6676175
-0.6044686
2.9
2.6
2.5
NamibiaB/B 0.3741449
0.3531342
0.3475813
0.9039065
0.8050329
0.8891928
0.1306594
0.1103805
0.0755580
0.1031179
0.1382214
0.0834216
0.2170364
0.1941859
0.1668191
0.2485821
0.3176178
0.3014101
4.5
4.4
4.8
NetherlandsC/C 1.4928393
1.4867756
1.5794039
0.9086835
0.9138274
1.0962277
1.7442498
1.7281209
1.7890534
1.7112457
1.7368314
1.8158133
1.8049879
1.8103764
1.8135691
2.1664578
2.1792504
2.1564683
8.9
8.8
8.9
NorwayC/C 1.5790435
1.6371994
1.6708436
1.2433767
1.3077529
1.3275432
1.8185722
1.8625810
1.8402558
1.4701670
1.5141283
1.6020971
1.8899805
1.9172503
1.8931428
1.9959253
2.1022293
2.1738202
8.6
8.6
9
New ZealandC/C 1.5105080
1.5458669
1.6203254
1.0336545
1.2233320
1.3741648
1.8475948
1.8078824
1.8807224
1.8326137
1.8080502
1.9670571
1.9363251
1.8686597
1.9072638
2.4622020
2.3962943
2.3375377
9.4
9.3
9.5
PakistanA/A -0.8999985
-0.8428250
-0.8729264
-2.6269967
-2.6733784
-2.8120801
-0.7785802
-0.7592706
-0.8107213
-0.5533440
-0.5832578
-0.6267332
-0.8419176
-0.7392923
-0.9094912
-1.0442645
-1.0711113
-1.0526592
2.4
2.3
2.5
PanamaB/B 0.5809519
0.5239200
0.5171696
0.0388166
-0.1102497
-0.0277646
0.1426440
0.1322316
0.0944815
0.3766306
0.3785193
0.4266677
-0.1262950
-0.1027193
-0.0068184
-0.3181698
-0.3516879
-0.3414560
3.4
3.6
3.3
ParaguayA/A -0.1728591
-0.1164800
-0.1108857
-0.8701075
-0.8100618
-0.6673431
-0.9225848
-0.9368197
-0.8353350
-0.4208652
-0.3356148
-0.3489732
-0.9561554
-0.9103018
-0.8473799
-0.8290727
-0.7418506
-0.7132877
2.1
2.2
2.2
PeruA/B 0.0405872
0.0664036
0.0915839
-1.1809401
-0.9768856
-0.7377773
-0.4224070
-0.2031367
-0.1456786
0.4013555
0.4607087
0.4768813
-0.6627456
-0.6002165
-0.6099757
-0.3421613
-0.2504282
-0.2493100
3.7
3.5
3.4
PhilippinesA/B -0.0281591
-0.0584959
-0.0416617
-1.7127827
-1.6319936
-1.3846995
-0.0337626
-0.0175709
0.0843841
-0.0924322
-0.2168983
-0.2096517
-0.5989732
-0.5839188
-0.5379927
-0.7717154
-0.8036748
-0.6965103
2.4
2.4
2.6
PolandB/C 1.0145409
1.0255683
1.0148867
0.9045516
0.9877911
1.0569467
0.5235112
0.6371619
0.6219883
0.9529154
0.9854769
0.9354750
0.5966590
0.6578375
0.7513222
0.3701248
0.4131818
0.4851290
5
5.3
5.5
PortugalC/C 1.1253708
1.0989267
1.0981141
0.7636345
0.7019104
0.7215386
1.1591845
1.0217183
0.9587681
0.9715673
0.7215690
0.6168154
1.0464419
1.0432232
1.0260728
1.0386799
1.0305711
1.0842155
5.8
6
6.1
QatarC/C -0.8881107
-0.8943258
-0.9628679
1.2086905
1.1187074
1.1672480
0.9966018
0.8911757
0.7767179
0.6895436
0.6059891
0.4911172
1.0112191
0.9456219
0.8420267
1.7228492
1.5686968
1.0824186
7
7.7
7.2
RomaniaB/B 0.4582098
0.4227225
0.3655299
0.3525046
0.2461356
0.1684590
-0.3559274
-0.2508709
-0.3122313
0.5937399
0.6404803
0.6569408
0.0344668
0.0356661
0.0476200
-0.2666863
-0.2154220
-0.1902079
3.8
3.7
3.6
RwandaB/B -1.2845263
-1.3106880
-1.3083124
-0.4730251
-0.1981866
-0.1354904
-0.1686910
-0.0472604
0.0744672
-0.3102291
-0.1800414
-0.1263599
-0.4937599
-0.3021875
-0.3082196
0.1330752
0.4625661
0.4285937
3.4
4
5
Saudi ArabiaB/B -1.7750653
-1.7361354
-1.8618862
-0.5073685
-0.2239489
-0.4605008
-0.0647715
0.0313610
-0.3214393
0.1795409
0.1833673
0.0288021
0.1597855
0.2595771
0.1356633
-0.0107539
0.0566928
-0.3749554
4.3
4.7
4.4
SenegalB/B -0.3299900
-0.3170279
-0.2690743
-0.1968649
-0.4271116
-0.2964352
-0.4958516
-0.5575702
-0.4539729
-0.2854215
-0.2701873
-0.2078767
-0.3705505
-0.4028072
-0.4879172
-0.5280863
-0.6938685
-0.5362682
3
2.9
2.9
Sierra LeoneA/A -0.2638892
-0.1842605
-0.2362301
-0.2965677
-0.2405907
-0.1701631
-1.2154467
-1.2099461
-1.1884043
-0.7773705
-0.7248363
-0.7022125
-0.9188638
-0.9558222
-0.8715485
-0.9385310
-0.7731903
-0.8220255
2.2
2.4
2.5
SingaporeC/C -0.2374846
-0.1982065
-0.0730917
1.1424515
1.1391284
1.1795293
2.2814519
2.2554316
2.1665091
1.8009041
1.7998013
1.7968435
1.6040557
1.6834772
1.7256305
2.2525894
2.2129163
2.1231172
9.2
9.3
9.2
South AfricaB/B 0.5520859
0.5833416
0.5764389
-0.1132230
-0.0189985
0.03166339
0.4755506
0.3926810
0.4112215
0.4011851
0.3576122
0.4053214
0.0929922
0.1075497
0.1264774
0.1434054
0.0927990
0.0340962
4.7
4.5
4.1
SpainC/C 1.1768784
1.1153502
1.0746124
-0.4656445
-0.2891529
0.0389475
0.9342550
0.9894321
1.0318841
1.1753592
1.1576062
1.0660287
1.1327881
1.1582577
1.1763495
0.9953140
1.0132770
1.0544729
6.1
6.1
6.2
Sri LankaB/B -0.4861460
-0.5187926
-0.5537244
-1.3473309
-0.9231097
-0.6991382
-0.1225255
-0.1833546
-0.1016116
-0.2638235
-0.2047123
-0.1063439
-0.0674764
-0.0755485
-0.0713073
-0.3709918
-0.3992263
-0.3738390
3.1
3.2
3.3
24
Continued
SudanA/A -1.6643401
-1.7225908
-1.7681543
-2.6518142
-2.6600205
-2.5291311
-1.2673655
-1.3672014
-1.3903954
-1.2531358
-1.3311796
-1.2971476
-1.2344808
-1.2961812
-1.2214777
-1.2148141
-1.2566750
-1.2285052
1.5
1.6
1.6
SwazilandA/A -1.2043305
-1.2514952
-1.2414234
0.0063353
-0.0444697
-0.4925916
-0.7474192
-0.5177149
-0.6954318
-0.5538121
-0.6022917
-0.6343458
-0.6139146
-0.4914311
-0.4560793
-0.1962115
-0.1673406
-0.2933010
3.6
3.2
3.1
SwedenC/C 1.5765284
1.5780230
1.6519677
1.0617384
1.0889314
1.2262988
2.0469758
2.0073316
1.9676430
1.6712903
1.6679399
1.9125772
1.9657564
1.9625309
1.9479030
2.2908287
2.3189690
2.2217955
9.2
9.2
9.3
SwitzerlandC/C 1.5857894
1.6287109
1.6309775
1.2770891
1.2282150
1.2840389
1.9642933
1.8869262
1.8671767
1.5782784
1.6488376
1.6394214
1.7552704
1.7663342
1.7375602
2.0933568
2.0986828
2.0514028
9
8.7
8.8
Syrian Arab
RepublicB/A
-1.6393491
-1.6395100
-1.7497409
-0.4929013
-0.8104290
-2.0119750
-0.5878275
-0.6029238
-0.4972777
-0.9520425
-0.8882102
-0.9289920
-0.4863683
-0.5048863
-0.6895985
-1.0677574
-1.0819880
-1.0453988
2.6
2.5
2.6
TaiwanC/C 0.8211583
0.8291041
0.8416095
0.5330451
0.8359737
0.9386801
1.1862632
1.1944255
1.1543662
1.0666490
1.1413086
1.1405036
0.9251635
1.0153894
1.0458228
0.5991090
0.7168822
0.8649786
5.6
5.8
6.1
TanzaniaB/A -0.1580806
-0.1315183
-0.1486719
0.0692917
-0.0216979
-0.0456780
-0.5932705
-0.5778156
-0.6178916
-0.4214608
-0.4090080
-0.4035363
-0.4762468
-0.4897628
-0.5369015
-0.4425221
-0.5390071
-0.6309320
2.6
2.7
3
ThailandB/B -0.4644876
-0.5008620
-0.4228436
-1.4154217
-1.4289623
-1.1243091
0.2807178
0.1940281
0.2054967
0.2404329
0.1879719
0.2129218
-0.2239259
-0.1972667
-0.2094795
-0.2804693
-0.3158482
-0.2900638
3.4
3.5
3.4
TogoA/A -1.0364148
-0.9990728
-0.9443664
-0.1862324
-0.2027896
-0.1807712
-1.3911764
-1.3844715
-1.3522638
-0.8580614
-0.8742416
-0.9955374
-0.8809670
-0.9134799
-0.8571527
-1.0271816
-0.9645153
-1.0045261
2.8
2.4
2.4
Trinidad and
TobagoB/B
0.5287696
0.4847272
0.4814516
-0.1423586
-0.0350810
0.1479746
0.3026633
0.2652316
0.3165731
0.5372960
0.4980900
0.4036441
-0.2311557
-0.2201163
-0.1946019
-0.2077509
-0.3637427
-0.2818035
3.6
3.6
3.2
TunisiaB/B -1.3138685
-1.3739657
-0.3869793
0.0580359
-0.0395656
-0.3688054
0.4038215
0.2381282
0.0584338
0.0023058
-0.0204361
-0.1923005
0.1994383
0.1219027
-0.1274057
-0.1100107
-0.1490342
-0.1776602
4.2
4.3
3.8
TurkeyB/B -0.0859277
-0.1172394
-0.1604871
-1.0318994
-0.9207515
-0.9556127
0.2892992
0.3080002
0.3627078
0.2988077
0.3086976
0.3819063
0.1018257
0.1176649
0.0798934
0.0740799
0.0299381
0.0552668
4.4
4.4
4.2
UgandaB/A -0.4973373
-0.5014084
-0.5155829
-0.9895654
-1.0057549
-0.9869743
-0.6164339
-0.5203159
-0.5040336
-0.1493775
-0.1547709
-0.1405176
-0.4183059
-0.3913537
-0.3461848
-0.8871338
-0.9043889
-0.8953211
2.5
2.5
2.4
United
KingdomC/C
1.3118691
1.2945345
1.2971972
0.1063631
0.4012845
0.3522841
1.5028822
1.5597883
1.5529801
1.5914834
1.7362128
1.6572325
1.7258259
1.7613611
1.6448453
1.6020917
1.5604578
1.5843287
7.7
7.6
7.8
United StatesC/C 1.0856407
1.1218738
1.1123725
0.4274564
0.4353017
0.5971747
1.5043971
1.5494080
1.5121591
1.3903865
1.4336494
1.4466683
1.5753502
1.6298378
1.6050059
1.2625986
1.2596634
1.2650395
7.5
7.1
7.1
UruguayC/C 1.1002216
1.1369935
1.1114170
0.7731232
0.8240150
0.9577487
0.5957077
0.6362628
0.5584622
0.3651304
0.3846426
0.4272462
0.6827802
0.6960787
0.6529912
1.1905343
1.2446652
1.2377604
6.7
6.9
7
VenezuelaA/A -0.8870522
-0.9016078
-0.9581654
-1.2737008
-1.2428352
-1.0853446
-0.9725413
-1.1023417
-1.1890152
-1.5768356
-1.6080948
-1.4701347
-1.5907717
-1.6448500
-1.6689060
-1.1572539
-1.2072380
-1.1613224
1.9
2
1.9
Viet NamB/B -1.4626455
-1.4764487
-1.4247212
0.2389375
0.1065800
0.1667461
-0.2486034
-0.2625494
-0.2317645
-0.6179877
-0.6120019
-0.5946119
-0.4740645
-0.5268918
-0.4831960
-0.5347946
-0.6279593
-0.6151475
2.7
2.7
2.9
ZambiaB/A -0.3195766
-0.2557004
-0.1819243
0.5346590
0.4616148
0.4706945
-0.7911401
-0.8300148
-0.6366958
-0.5024495
-0.4786313
-0.4211538
-0.4850474
-0.4978060
-0.4686933
-0.5132091
-0.5654289
-0.4782632
3
3
3.2
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Appendix 2: Estimation results for 1998
Table A2.1: Variation of GDP per capita (with corruption and governance data of 1998)
Explanatory
variables
Preliminary
specification (PS)
Preliminary
specification & VA
Preliminary
specification & LV
Preliminary
specification & GE
Preliminary
specification & RB
Preliminary
specification & RL
WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98
Intercept 1.14
(0.74)
-0.19
(0.93)
1.10
(0.70)
0.93
(1.03)
1.61*
(0.70)
0.45
(0.93)
2.04**
(0.66)
1.19
(1.03)
1.75**
(0.67)
0.81
(1.00)
1.82**
(0.68)
0.93
(0.95)
y0 -0.51***
(0.06)
-0.56***
(0.08)
-0.50***
(0.06)
-0.64***
(0.09)
-0.54***
(0.05)
-0.58***
(0.08)
-0.55***
(0.05)
-0.63***
(0.08)
-0.52***
(0.05)
-0.61***
(0.08)
-0.54***
(0.05)
-0.60***
(0.08)
Investment 0.13***
(0.02)
0.21***
(0.03)
0.13***
(0.02)
0.21***
(0.03)
0.14***
(0.02)
0.21***
(0.03)
0.11***
(0.02)
0.18***
(0.03)
0.13***
(0.02)
0.20***
(0.03)
0.11***
(0.02)
0.18***
(0.03)
Education 1.25***
(0.25)
1.49***
(0.35)
0.84**
(0.27)
1.17**
(0.37)
1.05***
(0.24)
1.15**
(0.36)
0.82***
(0.23)
1.26***
(0.34)
0.71**
(0.25)
1.14**
(0.37)
0.93***
(0.24)
1.19***
(0.34)
Population 0.002
(0.001)
0.07
(0.05)
0.002.
(0.001)
0.05
(0.04)
0.002
(0.001)
0.06
(0.04)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.06
(0.04)
0.002*
(0.001)
0.06
(0.04)
0.002.
(0.001)
0.04
(0.04)
Openness 0.42***
(0.08)
0.50***
(0.09)
0.43***
(0.08)
0.48***
(0.09)
0.35***
(0.08)
0.46***
(0.09)
0.34***
(0.07)
0.42***
(0.09)
0.37***
(0.08)
0.45***
(0.09)
0.34***
(0.08)
0.45***
(0.09)
WGI98 -0.66***
(0.15)
0.28
(0.31)
0.23
(0.27)
1.19***
(0.34)
0.75*
(0.30)
0.94**
(0.34)
CPI98 -0.31*
(0.12)
0.07
(0.21)
0.12
(0.21)
0.29
(0.26)
0.30
(0.29)
0.36
(0.25)
WGI98*VA98 -0.64***
(0.19)
CPI98*VA98 -0.36*
(0.16)
WGI98*LV98 -0.62***
(0.16)
CPI98*LV98 -0.35*
(0.14)
WGI98*GE98 -1.25***
(0.21)
CPI98*GE98 -0.46**
(0.17)
WGI98*RB98 -1.03***
(0.20)
CPI98*RB98 -0.50*
(0.21)
WGI98*RL98 -1.06***
(0.20)
CPI98*RL98 -0.49**
(0.16)
N 115 73 115 73 115 73 115 73 115 73 115 73
Adjusted-R2 0.589 0.592 0.626 0.617 0.637 0.622 0.685 0.628 0.668 0.620 0.666 0.637
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression variables with superscripts “***”, “**”, “*”, “.” indicating statistical
significance at 0, 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 % error level, respectively. GLS standard deviations are in parenthesis.
26
   Table A2.2: Variation of capital stock (with corruption and governance data of 1998)
Explanatory
variables
Preliminary
specification (PS)
Preliminary
specification & VA
Preliminary
specification & LV
Preliminary
specification & GE
Preliminary
specification & RB
Preliminary
specification & RL
WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98 WGI98 CPI98
Intercept 2.62**
(0.94)
3.28*
(1.36)
2.62**
(0.94)
3.18*
(1.58)
3.07**
(0.96)
4.09**
(1.39)
3.16***
(0.91)
4.47**
(1.46)
3.09***
(0.93)
4.65**
(1.44)
3.13***
(0.90)
4.52***
(1.33)
y0 -0.38***
(0.09)
-0.51***
(0.12)
-0.38***
(0.08)
-0.50***
(0.13)
-0.40***
(0.08)
-0.53***
(0.12)
-0.42***
(0.08)
-0.61***
(0.13)
-0.39***
(0.08)
-0.59***
(0.12)
-0.42***
(0.08)
-0.61***
(0.12)
Education 0.79*
(0.35)
1.19*
(0.52)
0.76.
(0.39)
1.22*
(0.57)
0.66.
(0.35)
0.78
(0.55)
0.35
(0.36)
0.85
(0.53)
0.35
(0.38)
0.62
(0.56)
0.38
(0.35)
0.63
(0.52)
Openness 0.35**
(0.11)
0.36**
(0.13)
0.35**
(0.11)
0.36**
(0.13)
0.29*
(0.11)
0.30*
(0.13)
0.31**
(0.10)
0.32*
(0.13)
0.31**
(0.11)
0.30*
(0.13)
0.30**
(0.10)
0.33**
(0.12)
WGI98 -0.10
(0.22)
-0.03
(0.48)
0.59
(0.41)
1.55**
(0.54)
1.04*
(0.48)
1.69**
(0.52)
CPI98 -0.05
(0.19)
-0.08
(0.33)
0.49
(0.33)
0.60
(0.37)
0.88*
(0.44)
0.96**
(0.36)
WGI98*VA98 -0.05
(0.29)
CPI98*VA98 0.03
(0.25)
WGI98*LV98 -0.49*
(0.249)
CPI98*LV98 -0.44.
(0.22)
WGI98*GE98 -1.10**
(0.33)
CPI98*GE98 -0.51*
(0.25)
WGI98*RB98 -0.83**
(0.31)
CPI98*RB98 -0.76*
(0.33)
WGI98*RL98 -1.18***
(0.32)
CPI98*RL98 -0.75**
(0.23)
N 115 73 115 73 115 73 115 73 115 73 115 73
Adjusted-R2 0.222 0.3209 0.222 0.3211 0.248 0.353 0.289 0.355 0.266 0.367 0.305 0.406
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression variables with superscripts “***”, “**”, “*”, “.” indicating statistical
significance at 0, 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 % error level, respectively. GLS standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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Appendix 3: Robustness check
The aim here is to check the robustness of the support that the estimations of equations (1) and (2) yield to GWH.
Following Méon & Sekkat (2005), and initiated by new growth literature, a new interaction term between initial
income  and  human  capital  (y0*Education) is included among the predictors in order to observe whether the
coefficients of the former explanatory variables resist to the new factor. The results of the checking are reported in
Table A3 for years 2009, 2010, and 2011.
Table A3: Robustness check (with corruption and governance data of 2009, 2010, and 2011)
Explanatory
variables
PS of equation (1) &
one interaction term
PS of equation (1) &
two interaction terms –
GE
PS of equation (1) &
two interaction terms –
RL
PS of equation (2) &
one interaction term
PS of equation (2) &
two interaction terms –
GE
PS of equation (2) &
two interaction terms –
RL
WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI WGI CPI
Intercept        09
                      10
                      11
-1.513
(1.62)
-2.22
(1.68)
-2.59
(1.72)
-1.25
(1.65)
-1.77
(1.70)
-2.19
(1.74)
-0.90
(1.47)
-1.56
(1.53)
-1.94
(1.60)
-1.03
(1.49)
-1.85
(1.54)
-2.22
(1.61)
-1.58
(1.47)
-2.18
(1.55)
-2.47
(1.61)
-1.76
(1.50)
-2.47
(1.57)
-2.75.
(1.63)
-2.18
(2.37)
-2.70
(2.44)
-2.56
(2.51)
-1.77
(2.35)
-2.21
(2.40)
-2.29
(2.45)
-1.98
(2.30)
-2.46
(2.37)
-2.30
(2.45)
-1.81
(2.30)
-2.50
(2.36)
-2.50
(2.42)
-2.44
(2.25)
-2.86
(2.33)
-2.64
(2.39)
-2.37
(2.26)
-3.05
(2.33)
-3.01
(2.39)
y0 09
                      10
                      11
-0.09
(0.23)
0.01
(0.24)
0.04
(0.25)
-0.11
(0.24)
-0.04
(0.24)
-0.005
(1.25)
-0.06
(0.21)
0.02
(0.22)
0.04
(0.23)
-0.07
(0.22)
0.04
(0.22)
0.08
(0.23)
-0.03
(0.21)
0.04
(0.22)
0.07
(0.23)
-0.03
(0.22)
0.07
(0.23)
0.11
(0.23)
0.42
(0.35)
0.50
(0.36)
0.43
(0.37)
0.34
(0.36)
0.42
(0.36)
0.42
(0.36)
0.45
(0.34)
0.51
(0.35)
0.44
(0.36)
0.37
(0.35)
0.49
(0.35)
0.49
(0.36)
0.49
(0.33)
0.53
(0.34)
0.47
(0.36)
0.42
(0.34)
0.54
(0.35)
0.55
(0.36)
Investment     09
                      10
                      11
0.09**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.08*
(0.03)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.06*
(0.03)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.02)
0.07**
(0.03)
0.07**
(0.03)
0.07*
(0.03)
Education      09
                      10
                      11
4.66*
(1.97)
5.45**
(2.00)
5.46**
(2.06)
4.36*
(2.04)
4.90*
(2.03)
5.00**
(2.06)
4.79**
(1.78)
5.26**
(1.82)
5.22**
(1.90)
4.77**
(1.84)
5.54**
(1.84)
5.66**
(1.91)
5.12**
(1.79)
5.71**
(1.84)
5.73**
(1.92)
5.21**
(1.86)
6.04**
(1.88)
6.17**
(1.95)
7.91**
(2.95)
8.44**
(3.01)
7.77*
(3.10)
7.07*
(2.98)
7.79**
(2.97)
7.78**
(3.02)
7.99**
(2.87)
8.28**
(2.92)
7.57*
(3.02)
7.28*
(2.92)
8.18**
(2.92)
8.20**
(2.99)
8.44**
(2.81)
8.75**
(2.87)
8.12**
(2.95)
7.92**
(2.87)
8.88**
(2.89)
8.99**
(2.95)
Population    09
                      10
                      11
0.001
(0.002)
0.004
(0.01)
0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.01)
-0.007
(0.02)
0.001
(0.002)
0.004
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.001
(0.002)
0.006
(0.01)
0.00
(0.02)
0.000
(0.002)
0.002
(0.01)
-0.003
(0.02)
0.000
(0.002)
0.003
(0.01)
-0.003
(0.02)
Openness      09
                      10
                      11
0.31**
(0.10)
0.32**
(0.10)
0.34**
(0.10)
0.31**
(0.11)
0.32**
(0.10)
0.33**
(0.10)
0.24*
(0.09)
0.26**
(0.09)
0.28**
(0.10)
0.22*
(0.10)
0.24*
(0.09)
0.26**
(0.10)
0.26**
(0.09)
0.28**
(0.09)
0.29**
(0.10)
0.25*
(0.10)
0.26**
(0.10)
0.27**
(0.10)
0.29*
(0.14)
0.30*
(0.14)
0.32*
(0.15)
0.30*
(0.14)
0.31*
(0.14)
0.31*
(0.14)
0.26.
(0.14)
0.28*
(0.14)
0.30*
(0.14)
0.26.
(0.14)
0.28*
(0.14)
0.28.
(0.14)
0.25.
(0.14)
0.28*
(0.14)
0.29*
(0.14)
0.25.
(0.14)
0.27*
(0.14)
0.26.
(0.14)
y0*Education 09
                      10
                      11
-0.38
(0.26)
-0.49.
(0.26)
-0.50.
(0.27)
-0.34
(0.27)
-0.41
(0.27)
-0.42
(0.27)
-0.47*
(0.23)
-0.54*
(0.24)
-0.54*
(0.25)
-0.47.
(0.24)
-0.58*
(0.24)
-0.59*
(0.25)
-0.49*
(0.24)
-0.57*
(0.24)
-0.58*
(0.25)
-0.50*
(0.25)
-0.61*
(0.25)
-0.63*
(0.26)
-0.94*
(0.39)
-1.01*
(0.40)
-0.92*
(0.41)
-0.82*
(0.40)
-0.92*
(0.39)
-0.92*
(0.40)
-1.01**
(0.38)
-1.07**
(0.39)
-0.96*
(0.40)
-0.90*
(0.39)
-1.04**
(0.39)
-1.03*
(0.40)
-1.07**
(0.37)
-1.11**
(0.38)
-1.03**
(0.39)
-0.99*
(0.38)
-1.12**
(0.38)
-1.13**
(0.39)
WGI              09
                      10
                      11
-0.50*
(0.21)
-0.55*
(0.21)
-0.47*
(0.22)
1.31**
(0.40)
1.31**
(0.42)
1.35**
(0.45)
1.32**
(0.41)
1.26**
(0.44)
1.29**
(0.47)
-0.40
(0.31)
-0.44
(0.32)
-0.24
(0.33)
1.07.
(0.64)
1.14.
(0.67)
1.34.
(0.71)
1.60*
(0.64)
1.64*
(0.68)
1.98**
(0.71)
CPI                09
                      10
                      11
-0.35
(0.19)
-0.37*
(0.18)
-0.47*
(0.22)
1.16***
(0.34)
1.06**
(0.33)
1.35**
(0.45)
1.06**
(0.33)
0.96**
(0.33)
1.29**
(0.47)
-0.19
(0.27)
-0.27
(0.27)
-0.24
(0.33)
0.81
(0.54)
0.67
(0.52)
-0.34.
(0.71)
1.22*
(0.51)
1.02*
(0.51)
1.98**
(0.71)
Table A3 continues on the next page.
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Table A3 continued:
WGI*GE       09
                      10
                      11
-1.26***
(0.24)
-1.26***
(0.25)
-1.23***
(0.27)
-1.02**
(0.39)
-1.07**
(0.40)
-1.07*
(0.42)
CPI*GE        09
                      10
                      11
-0.94***
(0.18)
-0.91***
(0.18)
-0.84***
(0.19)
-0.62*
(0.28)
-0.59*
(0.28)
-0.51.
(0.29)
WGI*RL        09
                      10
                      11
-1.19***
(0.24)
-1.16***
(0.25)
-1.14***
(0.27)
-1.31***
(0.37)
-1.34***
(0.39)
-1.44***
(0.41)
CPI*RL         09
                      10
                      11
-0.84***
(0.16)
-0.80***
(0.17)
-0.74***
(0.18)
-0.84**
(0.26)
-0.78**
(0.27)
-0.77**
(0.28)
N                   09
                      10
                      11
117
117
116
114
114
113
117
117
116
114
114
113
117
117
116
114
114
113
117
117
116
114
114
113
117
117
116
114
114
113
117
117
116
114
114
113
Adjusted-R2  09
                      10
                      11
0.476
0.481
0.469
0.460
0.463
0.455
0.572
0.570
0.547
0.563
0.558
0.534
0.568
0.559
0.539
0.557
0.546
0.524
0.231
0.241
0.236
0.236
0.247
0.249
0.274
0.284
0.275
0.266
0.274
0.269
0.305
0.309
0.308
0.300
0.298
0.296
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression variables with superscripts “***”, “**”, “*”, “.” indicating statistical
significance at 0, 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 % error level, respectively. GLS standard deviations are in parenthesis.
Table A3 shows that the signs of the estimated coefficients of the initial independent variables remain unchanged,
but the estimates of the intercept and those of y0 cease to be significant. The new variable y0*Education is always
negative and generally significant, and its entry in the regressions does not notably modify the main findings. As to
equation (1), its introduction in the preliminary specification even enhances the quality of results in particular
regarding our variable of interest. With both WGI and CPI, corruption remains negatively associated with GDP per
capita; this findings is statistically significant at least at 10 % level, remaining stable throughout the study period.
Total variance in the model has slightly increased. Moreover, in the second specification, the significance of
coefficients remains unchanged. The coefficients of corruption are positive confirming that when GE or RL is weak,
corruption generates significantly positive influences on growth. The negative signs of the coefficients of the
interaction terms between GE or RL and corruption also lead to the same conclusion. The adjusted-R2 values
relatively increase in the same proportions as in the former case.
With equation (2), the overall quality of the model also improves. The coefficients of corruption in the preliminary
specification are negative throughout the period, but remain statistically insignificant. With y0*Education and the
interaction terms associated with RL, the findings stay robust and are still in line with the conclusion that corruption
tends to be beneficial to investments. In the estimates involving GE, the significance of WGI is slightly reduced (to
10 % from 5 %). The coefficients of CPI are insignificant, meaning that estimates based on this index are inconclusive
about the impact of corruption on capital stock in countries showing weak GE.
